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Author:Garratt, R.
Qin, C.
Title:On market games when agents cannot be in two places at once
Journal:Games and Economic Behavior
2000 : MAY, VOL. 31:2, p. 165-173
Index terms:GAMES
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR
MARKETS
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors consider markets in which agents supply their time or the services of a capital good and the duration of the market is limited. The authors show that a coalitional game can be generated by such a market if the characteristic function of the game is superadditive. In the specification of a market, the physical process of trade is usually ignored. However, various aspects of the trading process can be important in determining which allocation are feasible in the market.
SCIMA record nr: 213027
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