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| Author: | Sheng, S. (et al.) |
| Title: | Do exchange hazards always foster relational governance? An empirical test of the role of communication |
| Journal: | International Journal of Research in Marketing
2006 : MAR, VOL. 23:1, p. 63-77 |
| Index terms: | marketing channels communication |
| Freeterms: | relational governance |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this empirical paper, economic and social origins of relational governance (here as: rel-gov.) are explored. Transaction cost economics is used to argue that exchange hazards (here as: exg-hzs.) might limit the use of rel-gov. when power asymmetry exists within a marketing channel. In addition, from a sociological perspective, a governance mechanism is not determined solely by initial exchange conditions. It is argued that the social contact occuring through inter-organizational communication not only is a critical determinant of rel-gov., but it also may moderate opportunism arising from exg-hzs., thus increasing the establishment of rel-gov. Overall, the empirical results support this paper's hypotheses. |
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