search query: @indexterm taxation / total: 1872
reference: 462 / 1872
| Author: | Friedman, E. (et al.) |
| Title: | Dodging the grabbing hand: The determinants of unofficial activity in 69 countries |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2000 : JUN, VOL. 76:3, p. 459-493 |
| Index terms: | International Taxation Corruption Government Legislation Economic theory Regression analysis Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Across 69 countries, higher tax rates are associated with less unofficial activity as a percent of GDP but corruption is associated with more unofficial activity. Entrepreneurs go underground not to avoid official taxes but to reduce the burden of bureaucracy corruption. Dodging the "grabbing hand" in this way reduces tax revenues as a percent of both official and total GDP. As a result, corrupt governments become small governments and only relatively uncorrupt governments can sustain high tax rates. |
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