search query: @indexterm taxation / total: 1872
reference: 458 / 1872
| Author: | Brueckner, J.K. |
| Title: | A Tiebout/tax-competition model |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2000 : AUG, VOL. 77:2, p. 285-306 |
| Index terms: | Taxation Competition Consumers Public goods Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes a Tiebout/tax-competition model, where heterogeneity of consumer preferences is introduced into standard tax-competition framework. Following the modern Tiebout tradition, consumer sorting in the model is achieved through the activities of profit-maximizing community developers. A principal lesson of the analysis is that, under capital taxation, consumers with high public-good demands are worse off than under a head-tax regime. In pursuit of high levels of public spending, high-demand communities impose high tax rates, which drive away capital. The analysis also establishes a number of other results. |
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