search query: @indexterm taxation / total: 1872
reference: 420 / 1872
| Author: | Nyborg, K. |
| Title: | Voluntary agreements and non-verifiable emissions |
| Journal: | Environmental and Resource Economics
2000 : OCT, VOL. 17:2, p. 125-144 |
| Index terms: | CONTRACTS TAXATION POLLUTION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | If pollution is observable, but some emissions cannot be verified by court, voluntary agreements between a regulator and an industry may be welfare-improving compared to second-best emission taxes. Such agreements differ from direct regulation in a non-trivial way. The first-best optimum may be included in the set of possible agreements, even if it is not attainable using tax instruments. The non-verifiability may, for example, be associated with delimitation problems in defining the pollution tax base. |
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