search query: @indexterm taxation / total: 1872
reference: 95 / 1872
| Author: | Baldursson, F.M. Fehr, N-H. von der |
| Title: | A whiter shade of pale: On the political economy of regulatory instruments |
| Journal: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2007 : MAR, VOL. 5:1, p. 37-65 |
| Index terms: | political economy environmental economics government regulations taxation |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper, an intertemporal policy game btw. changing governments differing in their attitudes towards a particular feature of market outcomes is considered. It is demonstrated that a "brown" government favours emission quotas over effluent taxes, as quotas establish property rights being costly to reverse. Conversely, a "green" government prefers to regulate by taxes to limit the incentives of future brown governments to ease regulations. Strategic behaviour tends to exaggerate policy differences, making green governments greener and brown governments browner etc. |
SCIMA