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| Author: | Aragones, E. Palfrey, T. Postlewaite, A. |
| Title: | Political reputations and campaign promises |
| Journal: | Journal of the European Economic Association
2007 : JUN, VOL. 5:4, p. 846-884 |
| Index terms: | politics elections voting models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes conditions under which candidates' (hereafter as: cand./cands.) reputations may affect voters' beliefs on what policy will be implemented by the winning cand. of an election (here as: elct/elcts). Developed is a model of repeated elcts. with complete information in which cands. are purely ideological. Analyzed is an equilibrium in which voters' strategies involve a credible threat to punish cands. who back off on their campaign promises (as: c-prs.) and in which all c-prs. are believed by voters and honored by cands. Characterized are the maximal credible c-prs. It is found that the degree to which c-prs. are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a cand.'s reputation. |
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