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| Author: | Malueg, D. A. Schwartz, M. |
| Title: | International Telecom settlements: gaming incentives, carrier alliances and Pareto-superior reform |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
2001 : SEP, VOL. 49:3, p. 335-377 |
| Index terms: | GAMES MONOPOLY TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Liberalized countries that allow competition in international telecommunications favor traffic re-routing practices as arbitrage against foreign monopolists. This view is seriously incomplete. Monopolists, allied with carriers in liberalized countries, can use these practices to reduce termination payments to nonalliance carriers - thereby harming also consumers in liberalized countries - by gaming regulations that require equal termination rates at both ends and "proportional return" (the monopolist's traffic is allocated among carriers in proportion to their shares of traffic to its country). |
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