search query: @indexterm ORGANIZATION THEORY / total: 191
reference: 88 / 191
Author: | Noorderhaven, N. G. |
Title: | The problem of contract enforcement in economic organization theory |
Journal: | Organization Studies
1992 : VOL. 13:2, p.229-243 |
Index terms: | CONTRACTS ORGANIZATION THEORY ECONOMIC THEORY LAW |
Language: | eng |
Abstract: | The newly developed economic theories of organization - unlike sociological theories of organization - explicitly employ an individual utility maximization assumption. It is argued that this assumption, if used as in agency theory, entails logical inconsistencies and it is a barrier to explaining the existence of the kind of agreements that purportedly form the basis of organizations. A classificatory scheme of four "sources of obligation" is proposed for the analysis of the basis of agreements. Taking all four sources into consideration can help to avoid one-sided attention to, for example, formal, legally enforceable agreements. The findings suggest that the scheme has two basic dimensions at the root. |
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