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| Author: | Leech, D. |
| Title: | Ownership concentration and the theory of the firm : a simple-game-theoretic approach. |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1987 : MAR, VOL. 35:3, p. 225-240 |
| Index terms: | GAME THEORY FIRM (THEORY OF) SHAREHOLDERS MANAGEMENT CONTROL |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A model of shareholder constraint is described in terms of the relationship between shareholding concentration and corporate control. A unified perspective is developed whereby leading coalitions are costly to form and possess power in a shareholder-voting game. Control is defined in terms of power indices for simple games. A static theory of the firm is developed in terms of the optimal formation of controlling coalitions. A dynamic theory of an owner-controlled firm is described which explains increasing share-holding dispersion accompanying growth. |
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