search query: @author Marino, A. M. / total: 2
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| Author: | Campbell, T. S. Chan, Y-Sh. Marino, A. M. |
| Title: | Incentives for information production and optimal job assignment with human capital considerations |
| Journal: | Economica
1993 : FEB, VOL. 60:237,p. 13-26 |
| Index terms: | INCENTIVES INFORMATION HUMAN CAPITAL MANAGERS RISK BEHAVIOUR |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The problem of inducing a manager to acquire information which is useful in determining his optimal job assigment, but which might also adversely affect his market value is examined. It is shown that spot conctracts are optimal and generate the first-best effort level when the manager is risk-neutral. When the manager is risk-averse, the optimal contract consists either of a partial insurance contract against downward revisions in compensation or a competitive spot contract, depending upon the nature of prior information. |
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