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| Author: | Binmore, K. Samuelson, L. |
| Title: | An economist's perspective on the evolution of norms |
| Journal: | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
1994 : MAR, VOL. 150:1, p. 45-63 |
| Index terms: | GAME THEORY ECONOMICS SOCIOLOGY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper seeks to close the gap between the models of man used by economists and sociologists. The problem of the evolution of social norms is identified with the equilibrium selection problem in game theory. Adopting such a view requires that sociologists be ready to regard social norms as being endogenously determined, and for economists to abandon the literature on refinements of Nash equilibrium in favour of an evolutional approach. |
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