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| Author: | Cho, I. |
| Title: | Bounded rationality, neural network and folk theorem in repeated games with discounting |
| Journal: | Economic Theory
1994 : VOL. 4:6, p. 935-957 |
| Index terms: | RATIONALITY NEURAL NETWORKS GAMES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The perfect folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) need not rely on excessively complex strategies. The author recovers the perfect folk theorem for two person repeated games with discounting through neural networks that have finitely many associative units. The uniform upper bound of the complexity of equilibrium strategies differentiates this paper from Ben-Porath and Peleg (1987) in which we need to admit even more complex strategies in order to expand the set of equilibrium outcomes. |
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