search query: @author Cullis, J.G. / total: 2
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| Author: | Jones, P.R. Cullis, J.G. |
| Title: | Bureaucracy and intergovernmental grants: Comment |
| Journal: | Kyklos
1994 : VOL. 47:3, p. 437-448 |
| Index terms: | BUREAUCRACY PUBLIC EXPENDITURE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS WELFARE ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Intergovernmental grants have been explained in public finance texts by reference to the conventional welfare economics arguments of equity and efficiency. However, a more recent assessment of decentralisation questions the explanatory value of this approach. An alternative analysis, based on Niskanen's model of bureaucracy, will explain inter-departmental transfers within the public sector. This public choice approach emphasis the importance of price elasticity of demand, rather than spatial non-rivalness of public goods, in determining the federal segmentation of public expenditure. |
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