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| Author: | Chamley, C. Gale, D. |
| Title: | Information revelation and strategic delay in a model of investment |
| Journal: | Econometrica
1994 : SEP, VOL. 62:5, p. 1065-1085 |
| Index terms: | INVESTMENT INFORMATION EXTERNALITIES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors model investment as an N-player game with a pure informational externality. Each player's payoff depends only on his own action and the state of nature. However, because a player's action reveals his private information, players wait to see what other players will do. Equilibrium is inefficient because delay is costly and information is imperfectly revealed. The authors characterize the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium and study the robustness of delay, which turns out to be sensitive to the reaction speed and the number of players. |
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