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| Author: | Blume, A. |
| Title: | Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games |
| Journal: | Games and Economic Behavior
1996 : MAR, VOL. 13:1, p. 2-25 |
| Index terms: | STABILIZATION GAMES ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper characterizes robust outcomes in sender-receiver games. An equilibrium (a retract) is perturbed message persistent (PMP) if it is the Limit of persistent equilibria in perturbed games. In strict common interest games separating equilibria are PMP and message inveriant equilibria are not PMP. With partial common interest, there exists a PMP retract which partially separates types and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. Under a rich language condition only partially separating equilibria are PMP in partial common interest games. |
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