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| Author: | Aoyagi, M. |
| Title: | Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1996 : AUG, VOL. 70:2, p. 444-469 |
| Index terms: | EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS GAME THEORY INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The paper formulates a simple two-person model of learning with pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the asymptonic behavior of players' beliefs when the game has a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. In models of learning, it is recognized that the path of play displays some conspicuous patterns when players use simple rules in assessing their opponents' behavior. If the players themselves become aware of such patterns , they may want to utilize them in an attempt to better assess their opponents' behavior. This paper formulates a simple two-person model of learning that allows such pattern recognition and discusses its implications. In particular, it focuses on the convergence of players' beliefs to a mixed Nash equilibrium of a game. |
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