search query: @author Velthuis, L. J. / total: 2
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| Author: | Gillenkirch, R. Velthuis, L. J. |
| Title: | Lineare Anreizverträge für Manager bei systematischen und unsystematischen Risiken |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1997 : VOL. 49:2, p. 121-140 |
| Index terms: | MANAGERIAL ACTIVITIES INCENTIVES AGENCY THEORY SHAREHOLDERS CAPITAL MARKETS CONTRACTS |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | Managerial incentives are considered in a capital market setting, where shareholders have exponential utilities and where returns are normally distributed. Managers are effort-averse and have exponential utilities, too. Each manager influences his firm's returns by two kinds of effort, one which increases his firm's expected return, one which decreases the variance of returns due to unsystematic disturbances. Systematic risks are assumed to be given. Incentive contracts are restricted to be linear in returns. Due to a similiarity property of the market allocation, a representative shareholder exists who, in designing the incentive contract, jointly maximizes the expected utility of every other shareholder. Optimal incentive contracts and their properties are derived and analysed. |
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