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| Author: | Nöldeke, G. Samuelson, L. |
| Title: | A dynamic model of equilibrium selection in signaling markets |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1997 : MAR, VOL. 73:1, p. 118-156 |
| Index terms: | SIGNALING MARKETS PRICES |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper pursues an approach to equilibrium selection in signaling models based on examining the limiting outcome of a dynamic process subjected to arbitrarily rare perturbations. This is viewed as simply folloving through Spence's suggestion that dynamic models can be used to choose between equilibria. The motivation offered for many equilibrium refinements is implicitly dynamic, and the paper views a dynamic model as the natural setting for examining such refinements. Refinement ideas were found emerging from the dynamic analysis despite the differences between the adaptive agents of the model and the rational agents of most refinements. |
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