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| Author: | Budde, J. Wielenberg, S. |
| Title: | Rank-Order-Tournaments als Entlohnungsschemata |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1997 : VOL. 49:11, p. 923-950 |
| Index terms: | HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EMPLOYEE MOTIVATION PAY |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | Rank order tournaments, where payments depend only on relative performance, are frequently used for incentive devices. In this paper we consider a model with deterministic technology to analyze agents' effort under rank order incentive schemes under complete and incomplete informa- tion about agents' skills. The agents can exert effort to produce private output and collective output as a member in a team with all other agents. First it is shown that there is never any effort for team production in an equilibrium, because team production does not change relative performance. In a tournament under complete information small differences in the individual skills of the agens lead to very low effort levels for lower skilled agents. However, high skilled agents exert more effort to increase the probability of winning the tournament. |
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