search query: @author Olsen, T. E. / total: 2
reference: 2 / 2
« previous | next »
| Author: | Olsen, T. E. Torsvik, G. |
| Title: | Collusion and renegotiation in hierarchies: a case of beneficial corruption. |
| Journal: | International Economic Review
1998 : MAY, VOL. 39:2, p. 413-438 |
| Index terms: | CORRUPTION ADMINISTRATION SUPERVISION ECONOMETRIC MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Corruption opportunities arise when a principal delegates enforcement or audit authority to a supervisor. The supervisor may then strike a deal with the agent she is supposed to monitor and conceal important information from the principal. Corruption imposes a constraint on governance and appear therefore to be harmful for the principal. The authors show that this need not be the case. In their model the prospect of corruption can make the principal better off. The reason is that the collusion possibility generates dynamic effects which, in cases where only limited intertemporal commitment can be made, may be beneficial for the principal. |
« previous | next »
SCIMA