search query: @author Sundaram, R. K. / total: 2
reference: 2 / 2
« previous | next »
| Author: | Banks, J. S. Sundaram, R. K. |
| Title: | Optimal retention in agency problems |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
1998 : OCT, VOL. 82:2, p. 293-323 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMIC THEORY AGENCIES COMPENSATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study examines the interaction between a single long-lived principal and a series of short-lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. It is assumed that the principal can influence the agents' behavior only through her choice of a retention rule, which is further required to be sequentially rational. General conditions are provided, under which equilibria exist where the principal adopts a cut-off rule under which agents are retained only when the reward they generate exceed a critical bound, and agents separate according to type with better agents taking superior actions. |
« previous | next »
SCIMA