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| Author: | Bendor, J. Swistak, P. |
| Title: | Evolutionary equilibria: characterization theorems and their implications |
| Journal: | Theory and Decision
1998 : OCT, VOL. 45:2, p. 99-159 |
| Index terms: | EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS GAME THEORY STRATEGY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. When does stability fail? To resolve these questions the authors re-examine the very foundations of the evolutionary model. The results of this paper can be analytically separated into three parts: the first part is conceptual, the second part is deductive and the third part is applied. The results essentially explain when cooperation is an is not stable, and why. |
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