search query: @author Schummer, J. / total: 2
reference: 1 / 2
« previous | next »
| Author: | Schummer, J. |
| Title: | Manipulation through bribes |
| Journal: | Journal of Economic Theory
2000 : APR, VOL. 91:2, p. 180-198 |
| Index terms: | ECONOMIC THEORY BRIBERY ECONOMICS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The author considers allocation rules that choose outcomes and transfers, based on agents' reported valuations of the outcomes. A bribing situation exists when one agent could pay another to misreport his valuations, resulting in a net gain to both. A bribe-proof rule eliminates such opportunities. The author shows that under a bribe-proof rule, each agent's payoff is a continuous function of other agents' reported valuations. |
« previous | next »
SCIMA