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| Author: | Gelb, D. |
| Title: | Managerial ownership and accounting disclosures: an empirical study |
| Journal: | Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
2000 : SEP, VOL. 15:2, p. 169-186 |
| Index terms: | DISCLOSURE AGENCIES COSTS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study examines empirically the effect of managerial ownership on firms' disclosures. Agency theory predicts that investors' information requirements increase with the agency costs of the firm. Managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and therefore should reduce investors' information needs. This study tests the hypothesis that firms with lower levels of managerial ownership provide more extensive disclosures by examining analysts' ratings of firms' disclosures. |
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