search query: @author Benoit, J-P. / total: 2
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| Author: | Benoît, J-P. Krishna, V. |
| Title: | Multiple-object auctions with budget constrained bidders |
| Journal: | Review of Economic Studies
2001 : JAN, VOL. 68:1(234), p. 155-179 |
| Index terms: | AUCTIONS BIDDING BUDGET |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | A seller with two objects faces a group of bidders who are subject to budget constraints. The objects have common values to all bidders but need not be identical, and may be either complements or substitutes. In a simple complete information setting the authors show: 1) if the objects are sold by means of a sequence of open ascending auctions, then it is always optimal to sell the more valuable object first; 2) the sequential auction yields more revenue than the simultaneous ascending auction used recently by the FCC if the discrepancy in the values is large, or if there are significant complementaries; 3) a hybrid simultaneous-sequential form is revenue superior to the sequential auction; and 4) budget constraints arise endogenously. |
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