search query: @author Glaeser, E. L. / total: 2
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| Author: | Glaeser, E. L. Shleifer, A. |
| Title: | Not-for-profit entrepreneurs |
| Journal: | Journal of Public Economics
2001 : JUL, VOL. 81:1, p. 99-115 |
| Index terms: | Entrepreneurship Non-profit organizations |
| Freeterms: | Donations Soft incentives |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Entrepreneurs who start new firms may choose not-for-profit status as a means of committing to soft incentives. Such invcentives protect donors, volunteers, consumers and employees from ex post expropriation of profits by the entrepreneur. The authors derive conditions under which completely self-interested entrepreneurs opt for not-for-profit status, despite the fact this status limits their ability to enjoy the profits of their enterprises. They also show that even in the absence of tax advantages, unrestrected donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations would flow to non-profits rather than for-profit firms because donations have more significant influence on the decisions of the non-profits. |
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