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Author:Anderson, E. T.
Simester, D. I.
Title:Research Note: Price Discrimination as an Adverse Signal: Why an Offer to Spread Payments May Hurt Demand
Journal:Marketing Science
2001 : SUMMER, VOL. 20:3, p. 315-327
Index terms:RESEARCH
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
DEMAND
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors develop a general game-theoretic model, illustrate how the model extends to installment billing, and conduct a large-scale field test. The general model illustrates how selling to multiple segments may lead to an adverse quality signal. The authors illustrate how the model extends to installment-billing offers in a direct- mail catalog. Installment-billing offers allow customers to spread the total payment over a series of payments. All customers have the option of using installment billing, and customers who use the plan receive an economic benefit (an interest-free loan). The authors would normally expect this type of offer to increase demand or, at a minimum, leave demand unchanged.
SCIMA record nr: 229851
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