search query: @author Krakel, M. / total: 2
reference: 2 / 2
« previous | next »
| Author: | Krakel, M. |
| Title: | Delegation, strategische Anreize und Wettbewerb |
| Journal: | Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft
2002 : VOL. 72:2, p. 95-100 |
| Index terms: | DELEGATION STRATEGIC PLANNING MODELS OLIGOPOLY |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | Strategic delegation models have shown that owners will put a positive (negative) weight on sales in the optimal linear incentive scheme for the manager, if competition is characterized by the Cournot (Bertrand) model. This paper, however, focuses on oligopolistic tournaments. The results show that asymmetric equilibria are possible in which one owner puts a positive weight on sales whereas the other owner chooses a negative weight. If production is deterministic, one owner will induce sales maximization to his manager which forces the other manager to drop out of the market. The paper provides a substantial list of references on this subject. |
« previous | next »
SCIMA