search query: @author Egteren, H. van / total: 2
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Author:Egteren, H. van
Smith, R. T.
Title:Environmental Regulations Under Simple Negligence or Strict Liability
Journal:Environmental and Resource Economics
2002 : APR, VOL. 21:4, p. 369-396
Index terms:AUTHORITY
LIABILITY
RISK
ANALYTICAL REVIEW
Language:eng
Abstract:The authors use negligence and strict liability as the basis for environmental regulations and show that, when jurisdictions compete for firms that engage in environmentally risky behaviour, strict liability implements the socially optimal outcome while simple negligence does not, even if the jurisdictions fully cooperate in setting standards of care. Consequently, the authors argue that, even if jurisdictions delegate standard setting to a central authority, like in the European Union, this would not implement the socially optimal outcome. The authors also demonstrate that harmonization of environmental regulations makes more sense if strict liability is used rather than simple negligence.
SCIMA record nr: 237950
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