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| Author: | Andersen, T. B. Harr, T. Tarp, F. |
| Title: | On US politics and IMF lending |
| Journal: | European Economic Review
2006 : OCT, VOL. 50:7, p. 1843-1862 |
| Index terms: | loans politics IMF USA models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a model in which the U.S. acts as principal within the IMF, seeking to maximize its impact on the policy stance of debtor countries. Derived is an optimal loan allocation mechanism leading to the testable hypothesis that the probability of an IMF loan is increasing in the amount of political concessions countries make. Introduced is a bliss-point proxy. It is demonstrated that the hypothesis is strongly supported in the data. |
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