search query: @author Aron, D. J. / total: 2
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| Author: | Aron, D. J. |
| Title: | Firm organization and the economic approach to personnel management |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
1990 : MAY, VOL. 80:2, p. 23-27 |
| Index terms: | PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION MOTIVATION INCENTIVES COMPENSATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The research developing and testing implications of agency theory on the design of compensation contracts has focused on managerial labour contracts. The theory of monitoring to personnel management has seen even fewer applications to the personnel literature so far. It was shown that while agency issues may be directly applicable to managerial labour, for nonmanagerial personnel the monitoring problem must be addressed prior to the design of incentive contracts. First, the role of commitment in monitoring problems is described, this is then applied to a discussion of the difference between penalties and rewards in motivating workers. Japanese examples are shown for the organizational attempt to solve the monitoring problem. |
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