search query: @author Lin, Y. J. / total: 2
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| Author: | Lin, Y. J. |
| Title: | The dampening-of-competition effect of exclusive dealing. |
| Journal: | Journal of Industrial Economics
1990 : DEC, VOL. 39:2, p. 209-223 |
| Index terms: | COMPETITIVENESS FRANCHISING MARKETING MODELS |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The dampening-of-competition approach, introduced in recent works on equilibrium vertical structures, is used to understand vertical relationships. It is shown that, in the absence of intra-brand retailer competition, firms earn greater profits using exclusive dealing. The frequent simultaneous appearance of exclusive dealing and exclusive territoriality is explained. The results are used to analyse the famous 1949 Standard Stations case. The conclusion is that the 1949 Court did the right thing for a wrong reason. In the USA, exclusive dealing contracts which tend to create monopoly or lessen competition are illegal. Under exclusive dealing manufacturers compete for the privilege to be selected by the dealer which can downgrade the power of laws. |
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