search query: @indexterm Strikes / total: 201
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| Author: | Bolt, W. |
| Title: | Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents |
| Journal: | American Economic Review
1995 : DEC, VOL. 85:5, p. 1344-1347 |
| Index terms: | STRIKES BARGAINING INFORMATION |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The main purpose of this comment is to show that one of the efficient subgame-perfect equilibria described by Fernandez and Glazer (1991), the maximum-wage contract, is incorrectly stated. In their model, the union achieves the maximum-wage contract by threatening an alternating strike strategy, that is strike when the firm rejects an offer, but continue working at the old contract wage when the firm makes an acceptable offer. It is shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium only holds if the discount factor of the firm is not less than that of the union. |
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