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| Author: | Parker, P. M. Röller, L-H. |
| Title: | Collusive conduct in duopolies: Multimarket contact and cross-ownership in the mobile telephone industry |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
1997 : SUMMER, VOL. 28:2, p. 304-322 |
| Index terms: | DUOPOLY DEREGULATION MARKETS COMPANY OWNERSHIP TELEPHONE INDUSTRY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper estimates a structural model of competition for the U.S. cellular telephone industry in order to determine the degree of competition and its sources. The unique regulatory environment in this industry allows to make some important simplifications to make it possible to address and identify issues of collusion and its driving forces in an efficient and consistent way. The paper finds a need for public concern, as the duopolistic industry structure generally appears to be more collusive than a noncooperative duopoly. The evidence suggests that cellular prices are significantly above competitive levels. |
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