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| Author: | Fershtman, C. Pakes, A. |
| Title: | A dynamic oligopoly with collusion and price wars |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
2000 : SUMMER, VOL. 31:2, p. 207-236 |
| Index terms: | OLIGOPOLY PRICES INVESTMENT |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors provide a collusive framework with heterogeneity among firms, investment, entry, and exit. It is a symmetric-information model in which it is hard to sustain collusion when there is an active firm that is likely to exist in the near future. Numerical analysis is used to compare a collusive to a noncollusive environment. Only the collusive industry generates price wars. Also, the collusive industry offers both more and higher-quality products to consumers, albeit often at a higher price. |
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