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| Author: | Armstrong, M. Vickers, J. |
| Title: | Competitive price and discrimination |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
2001 : WINTER, VOL 32:4, p. 579-605 |
| Index terms: | Competition Oligopoly Prices Discrimination Models |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | In this paper, firms are modeled as supplying utility directly to customers. The equilibrium outcome of competition in utility space depends on the relationship pi(u) between profit and average utility per consumer. Public policy constraints on the deals firms may offer affect equilibrium outcomes through their effect on pi(u). From this perspective the profit, utility and welfare implications of price discrimination in an oligopolistic framework are examined. In addition, it is shown that an equilibrium outcome of competitive non-linear pricing when consumers have private information about their tastes is for firms to offer efficient two-part tariffs. |
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