search query: @journal_id 776 / total: 204
reference: 9 / 204
| Author: | Mitra, M. |
| Title: | Mechanism design in queueing problems |
| Journal: | Economic Theory
2001 : VOL. 17:2, p. 277-306 |
| Index terms: | STRATEGY BUDGET RATIONALITY |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a complete characterization of FB implementability of queueing problems. For a queueing problem to be first best implementable, its necessary and sufficient that the type vector of each individual satisfies a certain combinatorial property called CP and that the externality that can be imposed by an individual on the remaining set of individuals satisfies the independence property. This paper is an attempt at identification of cost structures for which queueing problems are first best implementable. The broad conclusion is that, this is a fairly large class. Some of these first best implementable problems can be implemented by mechanisms that satisfy individual rationality. |
SCIMA