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Author:Fahlenbrach, R.
Stulz, R.M.
Title:Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2011 : JAN, VOL. 99:1, p. 11-26
Index terms:financial crises
banking
insider trading
executive remuneration
management
compensation
incentives
pay
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper explores whether bank performance during the recent credit crisis is related to chief executive officer (CEO) incentives (here as: incs.) before the crisis. There is found some evidence that banks with CEOs with incs. better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse. Yet, there is no evidence of better performance. Banks with higher option compensation (as: cmpsn.) and a larger fraction of cmpsn. for their CEO cash bonuses did not perform worse. Bank CEOs did not reduce their share holdings in anticipation of the (or during) the crisis. Thus, they suffered extremely large wealth losses in the wake of the crisis.
SCIMA record nr: 271977
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