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| Author: | Emons, W. |
| Title: | Credence goods and fraudulent experts |
| Journal: | RAND Journal of Economics
1997 : SPRING, VOL. 28:1, p. 107-119 |
| Index terms: | MARKETS FRAUD ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BUYING SELLING |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This paper is about expert services and about a market for credence goods. Some professions have in common that typically the seller provides the prepair services and also acts as the expert who determines how much treatment is necessary, since the customer is unfamiliar with the intricacies and pecularities of the good in question. Since consumer can never be certain of the quality of the sellers' services, experts ahve strong incentives to cheat. If consumers rationally process all the information about market conditions, they can infer the sellers' incentives. |
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