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| Author: | Corazzini, L. Faravelli, M. Stanca, L. |
| Title: | A prize to give for: An experiment on public good funding mechanisms |
| Journal: | Economic Journal
2010 : SEP, VOL. 120:547, p. 944-967 |
| Index terms: | public goods fund-raising auctions incomes lotteries |
| Freeterms: | prizes heterogeneity |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This study explores fund-raising mechanisms based on a prize as a way to overcome free riding in the private provision (here as: prvsn.) of public goods (as: p-g/s.), focusing on an environment characterized by income heterogeneity and incomplete information about income levels. The analysis compares experimentally the performance of a lottery, an all-pay auction (as: a-p-actn.) and a benchmark voluntary contribution (as: v-cntrn.) mechanism. Prize-based mechanisms are found to perform better than v-cntrn. as to p-g/s. prvsn. In contrast to theoretical predictions, cntrns. are significantly higher in the lottery than in the a-p-actn., both overall and by individual income types. |
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