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| Author: | Bockus, K. Gigler, F. |
| Title: | A theory of auditor resignation |
| Journal: | Journal of Accounting Research
1998 : AUTUMN, VOL. 36:2, p. 119-208 |
| Index terms: | ACCOUNTING RESEARCH AUDITORS CLIENTS RISK |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | This article proposes an economic rationale for auditors resigning from the engagements of "risky" clients and use the rationale to examine claims that increases in expected auditor liability are giving rise to an increase in auditor resignations. The article explains how an incumbent auditor rationally resigns an engagement because any attempt at risk-adjusted pricing leaves him with only unprofitable clients, and successor auditors who know less about the client can probably accept the engagement of a client whose auditor has rationally resigned. |
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