search query: @indexterm LOCATION PROBLEM / total: 219
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| Author: | Boyer, M. Mahenc, P. Moreaux, M. |
| Title: | Entry preventing locations under incomplete information |
| Journal: | International Journal of Industrial Organization
2003 : JUN, VOL. 21:6, p. 809-829 |
| Index terms: | Location problem Asymmetric information Signaling Market information |
| Freeterms: | Entry deterrence |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The authors show that location can serve as a signal which deters or accommodates entry when there is asymmetric cost information. The analysis provides two new insights. First, the market center may be used to deter entry by a high cost incumbent who would accommodate entry under complete information. Second, a low cost incumbent may accommodate entry and locate away from the center, while she deter entry by locating at the center under complete information. |
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