search query: @indexterm ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY / total: 219
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| Author: | Sheriff, G. |
| Title: | Optimal environmental regulation of politically influential sectors with asymmetric information |
| Journal: | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
2008 : JAN, VOL. 55:1, p. 72-89 |
| Index terms: | asymmetric information environmental policy incentives pollution regulations |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | Politically motivated subsidies can lead to unexpected environmental outcomes. Asymmetric information between firms and government affect the government's ability to redistribute income and control emissions. This article identifies the characteristics of a social-welfare maximizing policy, considering the political and information constraints as given. The optimal policy employs one instrument to reach both goals, linking the income-support subsidies to pollution reductions. |
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