search query: @author Harris, M. / total: 22
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| Author: | Harris, M. Raviv, A. |
| Title: | The design of securities |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
1990 : OCT, VOL. 24:2, p. 255-287 |
| Index terms: | SECURITIES VOTING CONTROL CONFLICT CASH FLOW |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | The determinants of security design is investigated. The assignment of both cash flows and voting rights is considered, focusing on corporate control. It is assumed that a conflict of interests exists between contestants for control and outside investors. The conflict arises because private benefits of control give contestants an incentive to acquire control even when this reduces firm value. Security design is a tool for resolving these conflicts and maximizing firm value. The main result is that a single voting security is optimal. |
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