search query: @indexterm Benchmarking / total: 226
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| Author: | Bizjak, J.M. Lemmon, M.L. Naveen, L. |
| Title: | Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation? |
| Journal: | Journal of Financial Economics
2008 : NOV, VOL. 90:2, p. 152-168 |
| Index terms: | executive remuneration compensation chief executive officers management pay benchmarking |
| Language: | eng |
| Abstract: | There is empirical evidence found on how the practice of competitive benchmarking (henceforth as: b-m.) affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. It is found that the use of b-m. is widespread, having a significant impact on CEO compensation. B-m. can be seen as inefficient due the possibility of leading to increases in executive pay not tied to firm performance. Contrastingly, b-m. can also be seen as a practical and efficient mechanism. This study's empirical results generally support the latter view etc. |
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