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Author:Dowding, K.
Hees, M. Van
Title:Counterfactual success and negative freedom
Journal:Economics and philosophy
2007 : JUL, VOL. 23:2, p. 141-162
Index terms:philosophy
Freeterms:freedom
Language:eng
Abstract:Recent theories on negative freedom see it as a value-neutral concept; the definition of freedom should not be in terms of specific moral values. Specifically, preferences or desires do not enter into the definition of freedom. If preferences should so enter then Berlin's problem that a person may enhance their freedom by changing their preferences emerges. This article demonstrates that such a preference-free conception brings its own counter-intuitive problems.
SCIMA record nr: 265935
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