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Author:Grinstein, Y.
Hribar, P.
Title:CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses
Journal:Journal of Financial Economics
2004 : JUL, VOL. 73:1, p. 119-143
Index terms:Executives
Managers
Compensation
Pay
Mergers
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper investigates CEO compensation (hereafter as: comp.) for completing mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. It is found that CEOs who have more power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses. In addition, there is found a positive relation btw. bonus comp. and measures of effort, but not btw. bonus comp. and deal performance. CEOs with more power also tend to engage in larger deals relative to the size of their own firms, and the market responds more negatively to their acquisition announcements. This paper's evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial power is the primary driver of M&A bonuses.
SCIMA record nr: 255079
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