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Author:Nagarajan, S.
Sealey, C.
Title:Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation
Journal:Journal of Banking and Finance
1995 : SEP, VOL. 19:6, p. 1109-1130
Index terms:DEPOSIT BANKS
INSURANCE
MORAL HAZARD
Language:eng
Abstract:This paper examines the incentive compatible role of regulatory forbearance policy in the context of optimal bank regulation under moral hazard. The authors show that when a bank's asset portfolio returns have market risk, the regulator can influence the bank's choice of ex ante risk by delaying the closure of an insolvent bank. The optimal closure policy involves coordinating the closure decision with market-wide performance.
SCIMA record nr: 140009
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