search query: @indexterm Safety / total: 240
reference: 78 / 240
| Author: | Hempelmann, B. |
| Title: | Ein dynamisches Modell der optimalen Produktsicherheit im Duopol |
| Journal: | Schmalenbachs Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung
1997 : VOL. 49:5, p. 437-448 |
| Index terms: | PRODUCT QUALITY BRAND CHOICE SUPPLIERS REPUTATION SAFETY DUOPOLY |
| Language: | ger |
| Abstract: | On markets with quality uncertainty the brand choice of consumers is often guided by quality signals. One possible quality signal is the reputation of a supplier which is based on the quality expectation of consumers. The dynamics of quality expectations calls for a dynamic modeling of the optimal quality strategy for the supplier. Whereas previous approaches considered the case of a monopolistic supplier this paper uses a differential game approach to investigate the characteristics of optimal quality strategies in a competitive environment. It considers the duopolistic case for a specific quality attribute: the built-in product safety. The suppliers are assumed to try to maximize both the capital value of the profits generated within the plan period and their market share achieved at the end of the plan period. |
SCIMA